

Judgments

**QBD, ADMINISTRATIVE COURT**

Neutral Citation Number: [2016] EWHC 1265 (Admin)

CO/345/2016

**IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE**

**QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION**

**THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT**

Royal Courts of Justice

Strand

London WC2A 2LL

Thursday, 14 April 2016

**B e f o r e:**

**MR JUSTICE JAY**

**Between:**

**EAST LINDSEY DISTRICT COUNCIL**

**Appellant**

v

**ABU HANIF**

**(TRADING AS ZARA'S RESTAURANT AND TAKEAWAY)**

**Respondent**

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(Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)

**Mr P Kolvin QC & Mr D Dadds** (instructed by David Dadds LLP) appeared on behalf of the **Appellant**

The **Respondent** did not appear and was not represented

J U D G M E N T

(Approved)

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1. MR JUSTICE JAY: This is an appeal by way of case stated from the decision of the Lincoln Magistrates' Court, District Judge Veits, given on 23 June 2015, whereby he allowed an appeal from the revocation of a premises licence by the licensing authority.
2. The appellant, the East Lindsey District Council, is the licensing authority. The Magistrates' Court in the usual way is not a party to these proceedings. The respondent, Mr Abu Hanif, trading as Zara's Restaurant and Takeaway, is the licence holder. He through a licensing consultant has submitted correspondence making various limited points, but indicating that he would not be taking any part in these proceedings.
3. The premises in question are Zara's Restaurant and Takeaway situated in North Summercoates on the Lincolnshire coast. They are licensed to sell alcohol ancillary to the supply of food. The restaurant is owned and managed by the licensee, Mr Hanif. On 29 April 2014, the premises were the subject of a joint visit by the police and immigration officers, and it was discovered that Mr Miah was working in the kitchen as a chef. It was common ground that Mr Miah had no current entitlement to remain in the UK, let alone to work. I was told that he arrived here illegally some years ago. Furthermore, it was also accepted by the respondent that he (i) employed Mr Miah without paperwork showing a right to work in the United Kingdom; (ii) paid Mr Miah cash in hand; (iii) paid Mr Miah less than the minimum wage; (iv) did not keep or maintain PAYE records; (v) purported to deduct tax from Mr Miah's salary; and (vi) did not account to HMRC for the tax deducted.
4. The police then applied for a review of the respondent's licence under section 51 of the Licensing Act 2003 and the matter came before the appellant's subcommittee on 30 June 2014. The subcommittee decided to revoke the respondent's licence. Its reasons were as follows:
5. "The subcommittee were satisfied that Mr Hanif did not take the appropriate checks of staff members having knowledge that there were problems previously at the other premises with overstayers, and that he continued to allow staff to work at Zara's restaurant without making appropriate checks.
6. The subcommittee were satisfied that Mr Hanif had not undertaken the relevant checks to ensure the employee concerned was eligible to work in the United Kingdom. Instead of not allowing employees to work if they had not provided the correct documentation he allowed them to work and paid cash in hand. With all this in mind the subcommittee were satisfied that Mr Hanif had knowingly employed person/s unlawfully in the United Kingdom.

7. The subcommittee considered the evidence by Mr Kheng on behalf of Mr Hanif and the Home Office section 182 Guidance to Licensing Authorities. The subcommittee were of the view that the premises licence should be revoked and that revocation was an appropriate step with a view to promoting the crime prevention licensing objective."
8. The respondent then appealed to the Magistrates' Court. There was a hearing on 27 March 2015, and on 23 June the district judge decided to allow the respondent's appeal. On 1 September 2015, the district judge determined the issue of costs and on 7 January 2016 he stated the case. The appeal to the district judge was de novo, but he accepted that he could only allow the appeal if the subcommittee's decision was "wrong", the burden being on the appellant before him to establish that.
9. Looking now at the stated case, the district judge noted that the respondent had received a civil penalty for employing an illegal worker under section 15 of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006. An immigration officer gave evidence to the effect that although by virtue of section 21 a criminal offence was committed, such proceedings were rarely brought. The district judge also noted that the police and the Council's licensing officer were no longer saying that the respondent was a serial offender, but a redacted report which was placed before the subcommittee still gave the impression that he "was in a much worse position than he actually was". As for the failure to pay the minimum wage, the district judge said this:
  - A. "In his evidence before me Mr Hanif accepted that he had not paid the minimum wage and this in itself can be a criminal offence. I found that this was not the main basis of the subcommittee's decision however and again there was no evidence that he had been reported for that alleged offence. It would appear from their reasons that the subcommittee used the evidence of paying cash in hand as justification for the finding that he knowingly employed Mr Miah. The prosecuting authority however appear to have taken a different view in offering the civil penalty."
10. The district judge's core reasoning was that no crime had been committed. As he put it:
  - A. "It appeared to me that no crime had been committed as a result of the visit to the premises in April of last year. A civil penalty had been imposed rather than prosecution for the section 21 offence and no other crime had been reported in relation to not paying the minimum wage."
11. In the district judge's view, the crime prevention objective was not engaged.
12. The district judge also criticised the subcommittee for adopting an inconsistent approach because in other similar cases only warnings were issued. Finally, he considered that the subcommittee may have been influenced by comments in the police report, leading them to believe that they were dealing with a serial offender.

13. At the conclusion of the stated case, the district judge posed two questions for my determination. I will address these at the end of my judgment.
14. I was taken by Mr Philip Kolvin QC to various provisions of the Licensing Act 2003 as amended. Under section 4(1)and(2) a licensing authority must carry out its licensing functions with a view to promoting the licensing objectives, which include "the prevention of crime and disorder". The provisions dealing with the review application brought by the police are contained in sections 51 and 52. Under section 52(3), the licensing authority (and on appeal the Magistrates' Court):
  - A. "... must, having regard to the application and any relevant representations, take such of the steps mentioned in subsection (4) (if any) as it considers appropriate for the promotion of the licensing objectives."
15. The epithet "appropriate" was introduced by amendment in 2011. Previously the test had been stricter. In my judgment, it imports by necessary implication the concepts of proportionality and relevance.
16. Mr Kolvin submitted that the district judge erred in a number of respects. First, he wrongly held that, given that criminal proceedings were never brought, the crime prevention objective (see section 4(2)) was not engaged. The statute is concerned with the prevention rather than the fact of crime. Secondly, and in any event, the interested party had committed criminal offences in relation to tax evasion, the employment of an illegal worker, and employing an individual at remuneration below the minimum wage. As for the employment of an illegal worker, Mr Kolvin accepted that this requires knowledge on the part of the employer, and he also accepted that it is not altogether clear whether the district judge found as a fact that the respondent possessed the requisite knowledge. However, the core question is the promotion of the licensing objectives, not the fact of anterior criminal activity, and in this regard a deterrence approach is appropriate.
17. Thirdly, Mr Kolvin submitted that there was no evidence of an inconsistent approach by the subcommittee in giving warnings in some cases because all cases turn on their own facts. Finally, Mr Kolvin submitted that there was no basis for the district judge's conclusion that the subcommittee may have been influenced by a suggestion that the respondent was a serial offender.
18. I accept Mr Kolvin's submissions. In my view the district judge clearly erred. The question was not whether the respondent had been found guilty of criminal offences before a relevant tribunal, but whether revocation of his licence was appropriate and proportionate in the light of the salient licensing objectives, namely the prevention of crime and disorder.

This requires a much broader approach to the issue than the mere identification of criminal convictions. It is in part retrospective, in as much as antecedent facts will usually impact on

the statutory question, but importantly the prevention of crime and disorder requires a prospective consideration of what is warranted in the public interest, having regard to the twin considerations of prevention and deterrence. The district judge's erroneous analysis of the law precluded any proper consideration of that issue. In any event, I agree with Mr Kolvin that criminal convictions are not required.

19. To the extent that the analysis must be retrospective, the issue is whether, in the opinion of the relevant court seized of the appeal, criminal offences have been committed. In the instant case they clearly had been: in relation to tax evasion (see the common law offence of cheating the Revenue and the offence of fraudulent evasion of tax contrary to section 106A of the Taxes and Management Act 1970); and the employment of Mr Miah at remuneration below the minimum wage (see section 31 of the National Minimum Wage Act 1998). Moreover, given the evidence that Mr Miah never provided the relevant paperwork, notwithstanding apparent requests, the obvious inference to be drawn is that the respondent well knew that he could not, and that no tax code and National Insurance number had been issued. The corollary inference in my judgment is that the respondent well knew that Mr Miah could not provide the relevant paperwork because he was here illegally.
20. I also accept Mr Kolvin's submission that each case must turn on its own facts. As a matter of law, unless it could be said that some sort of estoppel or related abuse of process arose in the light of warnings given in other cases, the alleged inconsistent approach led nowhere. In my judgment, it could not be so said.
21. Finally, I agree with Mr Kolvin that there is nothing in the point that the subcommittee could have been misled about the interested party being a serial offender. The point that the subcommittee was making was the fact that the respondent had worked at premises where illegal workers were also employed meant that he should have been vigilant to the issue.
22. Thus the answer to the district judge's two questions are as follows:
  - A. Q. "Was I correct to conclude that the crime prevention objective was not engaged as no crimes had been proceeded with, the appellant only receiving a civil penalty?"
  - B. No.
  - C. Q. "Was I correct in concluding that the respondent had been inconsistent in similar decisions in not revoking the licence [sic]?"
  - D. No.

23. Having identified errors of law in the district judge's decision, the next issue which arises is whether I should remit this case for determination in the light of my ruling or whether I have sufficient material to decide the issue for myself. I should only adopt the latter course if satisfied that the issue is so obvious that no useful purpose would be served by remission. I am so satisfied. Having regard in particular to the twin requirements of prevention and deterrence, there was in my judgment only one answer to this case. The respondent exploited a vulnerable individual from his community by acting in plain, albeit covert, breach of the criminal law. In my view his licence should be revoked. Another way of putting the matter is that the district judge had no proper basis for overturning the subcommittee's assessment of the merits.
24. It follows in my judgment that the only conclusion open to the district judge in the present case was to uphold the revocation of the respondent's licence. This appeal must be allowed and the respondent's licence must be revoked.
25. MR KOLVIN: My Lord, I'm very grateful. Can I deal with the question of costs, both here and below.
26. MR JUSTICE JAY: Yes.
27. MR KOLVIN: Should I start with here.
28. MR JUSTICE JAY: Yes.
29. MR KOLVIN: My Lord, we would ask for the costs before this court. I just want to pray in aid four very brief points. The first is the result. The second is that the district judge's approach was expressly urged on him by the respondent's legal team. Thirdly, that the respondent was expressly urged to concede this appeal to stop costs running, he was given that opportunity at pages 42 and 43 of the bundle. Fourthly, perhaps a little bit tugging at the heart strings, but there's no reason why the Council Tax payers of East Lindsey should bear the cost of establishing what has been established in this court. So we would ask for the costs up here.
30. There is a schedule and the schedule has been served upon Mr Hanif by letter dated 16 March of 2016. I don't know whether the schedule has found its way to my Lord, if not I can hand up a copy.
31. MR JUSTICE JAY: It has.
32. MR KOLVIN: It has. My Lord, I can see that VAT has been added on. It doesn't need to be because of course the Council can retrieve the VAT, so my application is for £16,185. I know there's not a lot of explanation around my fee, but it was

taken on a single fee for all work involved in relation to the case stated; advice, the skeleton argument and attendance today, so it's one single - -

33. MR JUSTICE JAY: What about your junior's fees?
34. MR KOLVIN: My learned junior is also my instructing solicitor, he wears two hats.
35. MR JUSTICE JAY: I see.
36. MR KOLVIN: He has his own firm which is Dadds LLP, and he is also a member of the bar, so although he has appeared as my junior, his fee is wrapped up in the solicitors' fees set out in the schedule.
37. MR JUSTICE JAY: Okay. What about the costs below?
38. MR KOLVIN: My Lord, I'm just trying to ascertain what the position is.
39. MR JUSTICE JAY: I thought there was no order for costs below.
40. MR KOLVIN: There was no order for costs below, that was on the basis that the appeal had been allowed. The situation in relation to costs of licensing appeals are set out in section 181 of the Act, which enables the court to make such order as it thinks fit. Normally when appeals are dismissed there is no real question about it, costs follow the event. When appeals are allowed, some further considerations come into play, which are expressed by the Master of the Rolls in a case which you may have come across called City of Bradford v Booth, which is the case where the Master of the Rolls said that local authorities shouldn't be put off from trying to make honest and reasonable decisions in the public interest. And so one has to take account additionally of the means of the parties and their conduct in relation to the dispute, but in this case of course the appeal has now been dismissed, and so we would say that the ordinary rule is that the costs should follow the event, the appeal having failed. I'm just trying to ascertain whether schedules were ever served below, in the light of the way the case came out. **(Pause)**
41. My Lord, I'm really sorry that we don't actually have the schedule here, apparently it was £15,000. If you were minded to order costs below the options are either I suppose to wait and we will have the thing emailed up, or to say, "Look, it was below, it's a little bit more complex, they should be assessed if not agreed."
42. MR JUSTICE JAY: This is going to wipe him out, isn't it?
43. MR KOLVIN: Well he has already said, I have to say, I'm just telling you frankly what I've been told this morning, that when the bundles and the schedules were



served on him, he had clearly read them, but he said, "If you win in the High Court and get costs against me, then I'm just going to declare myself bankrupt." So there may well be a bit of football(?) about this, but nonetheless it was his appeal, his team raised a point which in retrospect was very surprising, and caused an awful lot of costs to be incurred.

44. MR JUSTICE JAY: Yes. Well I am going to assess the costs here in the round figure of £15,000.

45. MR KOLVIN: Thank you.

46. MR JUSTICE JAY: If there was a schedule, which you tell me there was, below, it is proportionate that I assess those costs rather than put you to the trouble of a detailed assessment, so if you could have that emailed to my clerk in due course, I will assess the costs below.

47. MR KOLVIN: Thank you, my Lord.

48. MR JUSTICE JAY: On the basis of that schedule.

49. MR KOLVIN: We're not trying to be too ambitious, but we would like to see what we can - -

50. MR JUSTICE JAY: I'll take a broad brush approach to that.

51. MR KOLVIN: Thank you.

52. My Lord, the only other thing to mention is that this isn't the only case which is kicking around the east of England where licensing subcommittees are being urged to take no action because there has been no prosecution in these immigration cases. Although I appreciate that this is hardly stellar law making, it's an application of pretty well established legal principles to the facts, I'm asking whether my Lord would be minded to certify this so that we can adduce the authority in other cases, because it's a clear statement of the law that there doesn't need to have been a prosecution. So with the practice direction in mind, would my Lord be minded to - -

53. MR JUSTICE JAY: Just remind me of the practice direction.

54. MR KOLVIN: Yes, can I hand it up?

55. MR JUSTICE JAY: Yes. **(Handed)**

56. MR KOLVIN: If Mr Hanif had come I wouldn't need to make the application. It's paragraph 6.1. The judgment has to clearly indicate that it purports to establish a new principle or extends the present law and that has to take the form of an express statement to that effect, and then 6.2 says what categories of judgment we're dealing with, which include applications attended by one party only.
57. So that's the situation we're in. In reality these judgments get around anyway, because we're dealing with administrative tribunals and not courts, but sometimes the point is taken, "Ah yes, but the court didn't certify".
58. MR JUSTICE JAY: But where's the new principle I've established?
59. MR KOLVIN: My Lord, what you have said clearly, which hasn't been said before, by dint of the fact that not many licensing cases reach the lofty heights of this building, is that there does not need to have been a prosecution in order for the crime to have - -
60. MR JUSTICE JAY: Oh, I see. Well that's so obvious it almost goes without saying, that's why it hasn't been said before.
61. MR KOLVIN: My Lord, it was obvious to everyone except the district judge, the appellant and other licensees in the east of England.
62. MR JUSTICE JAY: Okay.
63. In terms of the logistics, if you want a copy of the judgment, don't you have to pay for it?
64. MR KOLVIN: We may have to, and we would be obviously very pleased to do so.
65. MR JUSTICE JAY: Because I'm not sure that all judgments are, in the Administrative Court, they're not all transcribed and published.
66. MR KOLVIN: That is correct, and I have no doubt that my client would be - this isn't a matter about the costs of the judgment.
67. MR JUSTICE JAY: No, fortunately it doesn't cost that much. But I will give the certification. I have never been asked to do so before, I must confess.
68. MR KOLVIN: Yes.

69. MR JUSTICE JAY: Because these cases are referred to almost willy nilly, if they're available on Lawtel or wherever.
70. MR KOLVIN: Yes, they are.
71. MR JUSTICE JAY: Then they're just provided.
72. MR KOLVIN: They get into the textbooks and they - -
73. MR JUSTICE JAY: No- one objects.
74. MR KOLVIN: Yes. It has happened once before, in relation to the meaning of the Court of Appeal judgment in Hope and Glory, and Lindblom J, as he then was, was asked repeatedly would he certify in relation to the meaning of Hope and Glory, which is an important test, and he was pretty engaged in the practice direction. But since then that judgment, there's always an argument in court about whether it can be cited or not. The difference between licensing and some other fields of law is that very few cases reach here, so when they do, the judgments of High Court judges are gold dust.
75. MR JUSTICE JAY: Yes, well I'm happy to make the certification.
76. MR KOLVIN: Thank you very much indeed.
77. MR JUSTICE JAY: We wouldn't want this point to be taken again successfully.
78. MR KOLVIN: No.
79. MR JUSTICE JAY: Now as a matter of courtesy, is the judgment, once available, sent to the district judge, or is it something that I should do informally?
80. MR KOLVIN: I don't know, my Lord, what the normal practice is. I don't think that I have previously been on a legal team which has sent judgments, but we're very happy to undertake to do so.
81. MR JUSTICE JAY: Yes, I think if you're going to get a copy, obviously you're going to send it to the respondent - -
82. MR KOLVIN: Indeed.

83. MR JUSTICE JAY: - - so he can ingest it. I think you should send it to the district judge, just saying that the judge directed that out of courtesy he should see it.
84. MR KOLVIN: We're very happy to do that. Thank you very much indeed.
85. MR JUSTICE JAY: Thank you very much.